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CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES RECONSIDERED 
David A. Anderson* 
ABSTRACT 
 
For fifty years, the courts have debated whether the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that journalists 
be allowed to protect confidential sources. Many state and federal 
courts have answered in the affirmative, creating a First Amendment 
“reporter’s privilege.” The Supreme Court has declined to recognize 
such a privilege, but has not foreclosed the possibility. This Article 
suggests that the constitutional guarantee can be honored without 
prescribing a constitutionally defined privilege. Whether freedom of the 
press requires protection of confidential sources is one question; what 
means should be chosen to protect them is another. Courts should 
separate the two questions, deciding the first as a matter of 
constitutional law while leaving the choice of means largely to 
legislatures and common law resolution. Concerns about the scope and 
administration of a First Amendment privilege have deflected attention 
away from the underlying issue: whether compelled disclosure of 
sources abridges freedom of the press. 
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I.  ZEAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Constitutional law does not have to solve every problem it identifies. 
Sometimes it is enough to tell the state that what it has done is 
unconstitutional, explain why, and invalidate the action, leaving the 
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state to decide what to do about correcting the problem. In many 
instances, courts recognize this. When they hold a statute 
unconstitutional, they usually do not tell the legislature what it must do 
to make the measure constitutional. They invalidate the judgment that 
rests on statute and point out its constitutional flaw, but leave the state 
free to decide whether to amend the statute, repeal it, ignore it, or 
reinterpret it. Although their description of the problem often indicates 
what the appropriate repair would be, courts normally do not try to fix 
whatever infirmity in state law or practice led to the constitutional 
violation. 
When a First Amendment violation is found, however, courts—
particularly, the Supreme Court—seem to feel obliged to provide a 
solution. The most obvious example is the constitutional law of 
defamation. When the Supreme Court believes a libel judgment offends 
the First Amendment, it does not just reverse the judgment; it prescribes 
a constitutional rule that specifies what the state must do to make its 
defamation judgments enforceable. Thus, when the Court became 
convinced that libel recoveries by public officials threatened to chill 
robust discussion of public issues, it prescribed a test—the actual malice 
test—that courts must apply to permit such recoveries.1 Later, the Court 
added many other substantive and procedural rules—all of 
constitutional dimension—that states must observe in administering 
their defamation law: public figures must meet the same constitutional 
requirements as public officials;2 private plaintiffs who do not meet 
those requirements must at least show negligence, and the damages 
available to them are limited;3 actual malice must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence,4 and appellate courts must subject that finding 
to independent judicial review rather than the usual clearly erroneous 
standard;5 states must assign defamation plaintiffs the burden of proving 
falsity, rather than treating truth as a defense as the common law treated 
it;6 and states cannot permit recovery for defamation accomplished 
through hyperbole, satire, or similar nonfactual assertions.7 All of these 
rules trump state law. As a result of almost thirty Supreme Court 
decisions applying constitutional rules in defamation cases,8 and some 
                                                                                                                     
 1. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 2. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155–56 (1967). 
 3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974) (holding that private 
plaintiffs defamed in discussions about matters of public concern need not show actual malice, 
but must show some level of fault, and may not recover presumed or punitive damages unless 
they show actual malice).  
 4. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989). 
 5. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11, 514 (1984). 
 6. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
 7. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14–15 (1970). 
 8. For a listing of the twenty-eight libel cases decided by the Supreme Court through 
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lower court decisions creating constitutional rules that go beyond 
anything required by the Supreme Court,9 constitutional law plays at 
least as large a role in the resolution of most libel cases as the common 
law or state statutory law. 
In other media law branches of First Amendment law, courts 
generally have not created solutions as elaborate as those in defamation, 
but they apparently do feel compelled to provide solutions. The most 
broadly applicable solution is one that requires courts to apply a form of 
strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on truthful speech about 
matters of public concern. This solution began with a very general 
principle that apparently was to be applied to cases ad hoc. In its first 
application, the Court merely determined that the state interests 
advanced by a particular restriction “are insufficient to justify the actual 
and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press 
which follow therefrom.”10 This evolved, however, into a “test,” or at 
least an analytical prescription. The first statement of the test was just a 
single sentence, albeit one loaded with pregnant phrases: “[I]f a 
newspaper [1] lawfully obtains [2] truthful information [3] about a 
matter of public significance then state officials may not 
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent [4] a need 
to further [5] a state interest of the highest order.”11 Predictably, each of 
the key phrases developed its own jurisprudence, particularly (1) and 
(4). More speech turned out to be “lawfully obtained” than might have 
been expected; even information obtained by illegal eavesdropping can 
be treated as “lawfully obtained” in the hands of a third party.12 The 
“need” requirement came to mean that a restriction cannot suppress 
more speech than necessary, or at least must be a narrowly tailored 
means of achieving the state’s high-order goal,13 nd little deference is 
given to the state’s determination as to what is necessary.14 
                                                                                                                     
1991, see David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 
nn.1–2 (1991). The Court’s only libel decision since then is Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 
736–39 (2005), holding that an injunction against future defamatory statements violated the 
First Amendment. 
 9. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(concluding that the First Amendment requires recognition of a neutral reportage privilege, 
which protects some speech that is published with actual malice); Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 
518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that habitual criminal is “libel-proof,” i.e., cannot 
recover anything other than nominal damages even if he can meet all the other requirements 
imposed by the First Amendment). 
 10. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). 
 11. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). 
 12. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525, 535 (2001). 
 13. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812–13 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537–41 (rejecting explanations for state’s 
decision to prohibit disclosure of rape victims’ names by mass media without also prohibiting 
disclosure by word of mouth). 
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In some types of cases, the Supreme Court prescribes lists of factors 
lower courts must consider in deciding whether to restrict speech. For 
example, a judge contemplating restricting press coverage in the interest 
of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial must consider: 
“(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other 
measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial 
publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to 
prevent the threatened danger.”15 This is not just advice to the judge; 
she must make a record that satisfies the appellate courts that her 
conclusions on these matters are justified.16 Similarly, a judge 
contemplating closing the courtroom to protect an accused’s right to a 
fair trial must first determine whether the proceeding is one that 
traditionally has been open or is of a sort that benefits from public 
exposure.17 If at least one of those conditions is met, the judge must 
demonstrate that “first, there is a substantial probability that the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that 
closure would prevent, and second, reasonable alternatives to closure 
cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.”18 
The Court does not always feel compelled to prescribe remedies for 
First Amendment problems, however. For example, the Court famously 
invalidated injunctions against publication of the Pentagon Papers 
without specifying what the government would have to do to make such 
prior restraints enforceable.19 Several Justices wrote separate opinions 
suggesting what the government would have to show to win their vote 
to affirm such an injunction,20 but the Court’s holding was only that the 
government had failed to carry the heavy burden necessary to overcome 
the presumption that such restraints are unconstitutional.21 Interestingly, 
that precedent has proved to be no less durable, and no less effective in 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). 
 16. Id. at 568–69. 
 17. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986). 
 18. Id. at 14. 
 19. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). 
 20. The vote was 6 to 3. Justice Douglas argued that prior restraints on publication are 
never permissible. Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black argued that the injunctions 
at issue were so clearly unconstitutional that the Court should have vacated them without 
hearing argument. Id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, Justice Stewart, and 
Justice White argued that the executive had no power to ask the courts to enjoin publication in 
the absence of statutory authorization. Id. at 728–30 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 732 (White, 
J., concurring); id. at 746–47 (Marshall, J., concurring). Only Justice Brennan offered anything 
resembling a test to be applied to applications for prior restraints, stating: “only governmental 
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the 
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support 
even the issuance of an interim restraining order.” Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 714 (majority opinion). This brief per curiam opinion was the only one agreed to 
by a majority of the Justices. 
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protecting free speech, than others in which the Court provided 
extensive prescriptions of constitutional requisites. In almost forty years 
since the Pentagon Papers case, only a handful of prior restraints have 
survived appellate review; many others have been invalidated on the 
strength of its result, not because of any constitutional rules established 
by that case.22  
The practice of creating expansive solutions seems to have 
originated with the Court itself.23 Herbert Wechsler, arguing for the 
newspaper in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, did not propose the 
actual malice rule.24 He asked the Court to reverse the judgment on the 
broad ground that allowing public officials to claim they were 
personally defamed by criticism of their official conduct would revive 
the discredited notion of seditious libel, or on the narrow ground that 
the plaintiff had not suffered any injury sufficient to justify the 
“monstrous” judgment of $500,000 that the Alabama courts had 
upheld.25 It was Justice Brennan who initiated the project of using the 
case to construct a widely applicable constitutional regime to protect 
speech and press from the chilling effect of the common law of 
defamation.26 His opinion for the Court borrowed the actual malice test 
from a remote state law precedent,27 strengthened it, and married it to 
the idea of aggressive judicial review28—all without urging from the 
lawyers. Justice Brennan’s boldness in prescribing a solution much 
broader than necessary to decide the case, and his success in persuading 
                                                                                                                     
 22. “[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint, even faced with the 
competing interest of national security or the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Proctor & 
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). “Even where questions of 
allegedly urgent national security, or competing constitutional interests, are concerned, we have 
imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’ only where the evil that would result from the 
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures.” CBS, 
Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Presumably the 
exceptions Justice Blackmun had in mind included prepublication obligations. See Snepp v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 609 (1980) (upholding injunction against disclosures by former 
CIA agent). In the lower courts, the only prior restraint in the national security area that has 
survived appellate review was the injunction approved in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 
F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of details of the hydrogen bomb). 
 23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 24. Id. at 262–63; see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 120 (First Vintage Books ed. 1992). 
 25. See LEWIS, supra note 24, at 117–22 (describing Herbert Wechsler’s arguments). 
 26. For an account of Justice Brennan’s role, reconstructed from his detailed and 
voluminous official papers, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS 
SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 531–41 (1983). 
 27. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285 (Kan. 1908) (expanding a common law 
privilege to cover criticism of public officials). 
 28. “[C]onsiderations of effective judicial administration require us to review the 
evidence in the present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment 
for respondent.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–85. 
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the other Justices to go along, created a model that made First 
Amendment litigation a far more rewarding enterprise than it would be 
if courts merely invalidated judgments they found unconstitutional. 
Once the Supreme Court revealed its willingness to adopt sweeping 
solutions to First Amendment problems, the dynamics of advocacy took 
over and made this model the norm. Media lawyers represent clients 
who are likely to be repeat players in First Amendment cases. If they 
can persuade courts not to merely resolve the case at hand, but adopt 
constitutional rules that will apply to many other cases, they do their 
clients a great service. A consequence not mentioned in the opinions, 
but obvious to lawyers and judges alike, was that adopting 
constitutional rules effectively nationalized areas of law that otherwise 
would be frustratingly local. To media outlets that operate nationally or 
at least in multiple states, this uniformity itself is often the biggest 
benefit, and because most outlets are at least multi-state, lack of 
uniformity is itself a threat to freedom of the press. Lawyers for 
different media outlets often collaborate in formulating and advancing 
expansive principles that could have broad applicability. By 
establishing a constitutional rule that would benefit all media, a lawyer 
could win the applause not only of her client but of the wider media law 
fraternity. If there was any constituency for a more modest 
constitutional response, it had little chance of being heard.  
The resulting zeal for far-reaching constitutional solutions has 
infected the controversy over protecting the confidentiality of 
journalists’ sources. The basic question—when, if ever, freedom of the 
press is violated by compelling a journalist to reveal her source—has 
become complicated if not obfuscated by questions as to what should be 
the constitutional rules governing such cases. This Article aims to 
disentangle those questions, suggesting a way to prevent 
unconstitutional intrusions on the confidentiality of sources without 
involving courts in a morass of constitutional lawmaking. The heart of 
the suggestion is that courts can prevent enforcement of subpoenas that 
would infringe freedom of the press without attempting to design a 
comprehensive regime for regulating the subject. The latter is better left 
to legislatures and common law courts, but that does not require courts 
to ignore unconstitutional infringements. 
II.   WHY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES NEED PROTECTION 
Courts and legislatures have been debating whether journalists 
should be compelled to disclose confidential news sources for at least 
fifty years.29 Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have passed 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Legislation was introduced in Congress as early as 1959. See S. 965, 86th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1959); H.R. 355, 86th Cong. (1st Sess. 1959). A journalist advanced a First Amendment 
6
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shield statutes,30 and Congress may be poised to enact one at the federal 
level.31 Some state courts find in their state constitutions a guaranteed 
right to keep confidences,32 and many federal courts find such a right in 
the First Amendment33 or federal common law.34 This patchwork of 
statutes and judicial precedents makes instances in which journalists are 
actually compelled to disclose confidential sources remarkably few, and 
we see plenty of reporting that relies on confidential sources. It would 
be a huge mistake, however, to believe this state of affairs would 
continue if there were no constitutional right to protect sources. The 
constitutional claim that freedom of the press would be compromised if 
journalists had no right to keep confidences is not mooted by the 
existence of shield statutes. For one thing, the statutes provide varying 
degrees of protection, and when the relevant statute fails to protect a 
journalist, a First Amendment privilege may do so.35 More importantly, 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press is a potent 
background force in the statutory scheme. Legislatures often pass shield 
statutes in response to arguments that the Constitution requires them, or 
at least that they serve constitutional values. Similar arguments 
sometimes influence interpretation of the statutes—for example, 
inducing courts to interpret statutes expansively to avoid constitutional 
issues that might otherwise arise. The pervasive presence of 
constitutional arguments in confidential source controversies is largely 
the result of uncertainty. The Supreme Court has spoken to the issue 
                                                                                                                     
claim of privilege as early as 1958. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1958). 
Even before that, there were numerous controversies over protecting confidential sources, and a 
number of states had enacted shield statutes, one as early as 1896. See JOHN J. WATKINS, THE 
MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 299–302 (1990). 
 30. The Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press maintains a compendium of all 
the shield statutes, which is available at http://www.rcfp.org/privilege (last visited June 29, 
2009). This list shows thirty-four shield statutes. It does not include the Texas Free Flow of 
Information Act; 81st Leg., R.S., H.B. 670, effective May 13, 2009. Two other states recognize 
a privilege by court rule. Utah R. Evid. 509, West’s Utah Code Ann. (2009); N.M. Evid. Rules 
11-514 (West’s N.M. Stat. Ann. 2009). 
 31. At this writing, the proposed Free Flow of Information Act has been passed by the 
House of Representatives and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See H.R. 985, 111th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), 155 CONG. REC. H4204-09 (2009). 
 32. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279–
80 (N.Y. 1988) (recognizing qualified privilege under state constitution and First Amendment). 
 33. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. 
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 
F.2d 139, 146–47 (3d Cir. 1980).  
 34. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing a 
privilege as a matter of non-statutory federal law); see also Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 
641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Wash. 1982) (recognizing privilege as matter of state common law). 
 35. See, e.g., Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1342–44 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
Alabama’s statutory privilege did not cover magazine journalist, but First Amendment privilege 
did). 
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only once,36 and what it said was ambiguous enough to let lower courts 
create such protections as they thought necessary,37 nd at the same 
time, to encourage legislatures to pass shield statutes. If the Court were 
to definitively hold that compelled disclosure of confidential sources 
raises no constitutional concerns, that background influence on courts 
and legislatures would vanish, and news reporting that relies on 
confidential sources would diminish—for better and worse. 
If permitting journalists to maintain confidentiality of sources is not 
essential to freedom of the press, there is, of course, no need to consider 
what constitutional principles courts should apply in cases seeking to 
compel disclosure. I doubt freedom of the press requires as much 
protection as many journalists claim. For example, I do not find 
persuasive the argument that journalists should have a constitutional 
right to resist subpoenas for even non-confidential materials, such as 
outtakes and originals of published photos. Producing such materials 
may be inconvenient, burdensome, or even threatening to journalistic 
values, but non-constitutional remedies—shield statutes, protective 
orders, and motions to quash—can adequately address those concerns. 
Some confidential source cases, however, raise concerns of a far higher 
order. In a few instances, protection of confidential sources may be the 
only way to maintain democratic accountability. 
A.  Government Secrecy 
Experiences of the past decade demonstrate the inextricable 
connections between government secrecy policies and the need for 
news reporting based on confidential sources. Unauthorized disclosures 
by anonymous sources—leaks—are the bane of any government 
determined to control information. At the same time, leaks are an 
indispensable antidote to the tendency of governments to be unduly 
secretive. These truisms are in perpetual competition; government does 
its best to keep secrets, and dissidents, gossips, whistleblowers, 
troublemakers, and patriots—with the press as their indispensable 
ally—do their best to expose them. Subpoenas seeking to discover the 
sources of leaks are an important tool in any government’s information-
control program.  
Of course, not all subpoenas are directed at leaks of government 
information; many are obtained by lawyers seeking to compel 
journalists to supply evidence in civil litigation or criminal 
prosecutions, for example. But suppression of government leaks has 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–90, 697, 699 (1972).  
 37. One source lists decisions recognizing a reporter’s privilege in all but two of the 
federal courts of appeals. See James C. Goodale, et al., Reporter’s Privilege, in 3 COMM. LAW 
373, 382 n.2 (Practising Law Institute, 2004). The same source asserts that “state courts have 
also generally found that the First Amendment provides a qualified privilege.” Id. at 382. 
8
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never been far from the surface in the controversies over press 
subpoenas. After a few scattered instances in the first 150 years of the 
Republic, press subpoenas suddenly multiplied when the Nixon 
Administration became incensed about leaks to the press. Under 
Attorney General John Mitchell, the government procured scores of 
subpoenas. More than fifty were served on CBS and NBC, networks 
that had particularly angered the administration.38 The example set by 
the Justice Department inspired local prosecutors and defense lawyers 
to also seek journalists’ evidence, and soon subpoenas rained down on 
the press in unprecedented numbers.39 That eruption led to the Supreme 
Court’s only decision on journalists’ claims that compelling them to 
disclose confidential sources violates the Constitution.40 
That case, Branzburg v. Hayes,41 decided in 1972, arose from three 
garden-variety criminal prosecutions. In each case, a prosecutor 
subpoenaed a journalist to testify before a grand jury investigating 
suspected criminal activities.42 The journalists argued that compulsory 
disclosure of confidences would deter sources from talking to reporters, 
thereby abridging freedom of the press by hampering news gathering.43 
They urged the Court to adopt, as a matter of constitutional law, a 
“reporter’s privilege” that would prevent a journalist from being forced 
to appear at a proceeding or testify unless the party seeking the 
testimony could show grounds to believe that: (1) the reporter has 
information relevant to the investigation of a crime, (2) the information 
is unavailable from other sources, and (3) the need for the information 
is sufficiently compelling to override the invasion of First Amendment 
interests that would result from compelling disclosure.44 Deciding the 
three cases together, the Court rejected the journalists’ claims that they 
had a constitutional right to protect the confidentiality of their sources, 
but did not foreclose the possibility that in different circumstances the 
Constitution might limit the use of subpoenas against the press.45  
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source: Why the Plame Case is so Scary, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 29, 36.  
 39. See Fred P. Graham, Background Paper, in PRESS FREEDOMS UNDER PRESSURE: 
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS 
53, 55, 64 (1972) (reporting that in the first two and one-half years of the Nixon Administration, 
NBC and CBS and their wholly owned stations received 124 subpoenas obtained by federal and 
state prosecutors and defense counsel, and during the same period, thirty subpoenas were served 
on the Chicago newspapers published by Field Enterprises, Inc.). 
 40. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 41. Id. at 667–79 (including companion cases United States v. Caldwell (No. 70-94) and 
In re Pappas (No. 70-57)). 
 42. Id. at 668–69, 672–73, 676. 
 43. Id. at 679–80. 
 44. Id. at 680, 698. 
 45. Id. at 707–09. 
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In the years since that decision, it has become clear that Branzburg 
did not present the case for constitutional protection of confidential 
sources in its strongest light, for two reasons not fully recognized at the 
time. First, Branzburg presented the subpoena controversy in an 
ordinary criminal context rather than in the context of the leak-
suppression campaign that had motivated the Justice Department.46 
Governmental hostility might have been at work: one news report in 
question concerned widespread use of marijuana in the community and 
the other two involved the Black Panthers, a radical group that inspired 
a great deal of law enforcement angst at the time.47 But none of the 
reports involved threats to governmental information control policies, 
so the role of confidential sources in combating government secrecy 
was not implicated. Although the journalists tried to make that 
connection, the cases themselves did not put that squarely before the 
Court. Second, the specifics of a constitutional reporters’ privilege that 
the journalists asked the Court to create diverted the Court’s attention 
from the fundamental question—does compelled disclosure of 
confidential sources threaten freedom of the press? As a result, the 
Court did not decide that question. Instead, Justice White’s majority 
opinion devoted most of its attention to worries about how the privilege 
would work: Who would be allowed to claim the privilege? How 
effective would it be in easing the fears of potential informants? How 
would courts determine whether the prerequisites for invoking the 
privilege had been met? How would courts balance the need for 
disclosure against the interests in confidentiality?48 Justice White 
expressed skepticism toward the claim that freedom of the press 
required protection for confidential sources, but the decision seemed to 
be based less on doubt about that than on concern about the operation of 
the proposed privilege.49  
A series of meliorations averted a major showdown over 
confidential sources for following thirty years. The Justice Department 
adopted guidelines that restricted federal prosecutors’ use of 
subpoenas.50 Moreover, in addition to the seventeen states that had 
shield statutes when the Court decided Branzburg, eighteen more states 
adopted them, sometimes offering broader protection than the First 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 667, 672, 675. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 703–06. 
 49. Id. at 698–99. 
 50. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008). For discussion of the history and effectiveness of the 
guidelines, see Grant Penrod, A Problem of Interpretation: DOJ Guidelines for Subpoenaing 
Reporters are Useful, but No Substitute for a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA &  THE LAW, 
Fall 2004, at 4, 4–6. 
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Amendment privilege the Court declined to create in Branzburg.51 Most 
importantly, most federal courts and a considerable number of state 
courts recognized some sort of First Amendment privilege.52 Those 
courts generally dealt with Branzburg by limiting it to its setting—
reporters refusing to testify before grand juries—and adopted, for other 
types of proceedings such as criminal and civil trials, a privilege like the 
one rejected in Branzburg.53 
B.  Protection of Confidential Sources is Diminishing 
Hundreds of subpoena controversies were litigated during this 
period, some under the shield statutes and some under the First 
Amendment.54 Because Branzburg did not rule out First Amendment 
protection and encouraged passage of statutes, journalists in most 
instances continued to believe they had a right to keep their sources 
confidential, so they continued to promise confidentiality and usually 
resisted when confronted with a subpoena.55 Parties contemplating such 
a subpoena usually realized that the journalist most likely had colorable 
grounds, under a statute or the First Amendment (or both), for a 
protracted and costly contest, and this realization undoubtedly 
prevented a great many subpoenas from ever being issued. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 51. See, e.g., CAL. EVID . CODE § 1070 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 
2009). Both statutes create a privilege that cannot be defeated by showing a compelling need for 
disclosure of the source. CAL. EVID . CODE § 1070 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 
(West 2009). In California, the language recognizing the privilege has been added to the state 
constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 52. See supra note 37. 
 53. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st 
Cir. 1980) (holding that Branzburg did not foreclose recognizing privilege in civil case); United 
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing privilege in criminal case 
despite Branzburg). 
The rationale for recognizing a privilege in trials but denying one in grand juries is not 
readily apparent. It is true that the Court in Branzburg emphasized that the grand jury plays an 
important role in fair and effective law enforcement and historically enjoys broad powers. Se  
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 686–88 (1972). But one might suppose that the dangers of compelled 
disclosure might also be higher in grand juries, where the subpoenaed reporter usually will not 
have the benefit of counsel present in the room, and the secrecy of the proceedings conceals 
what transpires from the source and the public. 
 54. Goodale, et. al., supra note 37 (containing 472 pages of concise summaries of cases in 
which reporters litigated subpoenas). 
 55. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) lists nineteen reporters 
who were jailed for refusing to comply with subpoenas and twenty who were fined. Se  RCFP, 
Paying the Price, A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, 
http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited June 29, 2009). Many others, of course, resisted 
subpoenas and were not held in contempt. Id.; see Goodale, et al, supra note 37 (summarizing 
cases which indicate that most reporters resisted their subpoenas successfully). 
11
Anderson: Confidential Sources Reconsidered
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
894 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
This uneasy accommodation has now come unraveled through a 
confluence of separate events. One was an influential opinion by Judge 
Posner, who said some of the decisions in other circuits “essentially 
ignore Branzburg,” or “audaciously declare that Branzburg actually 
created a reporter’s privilege.”56 Over the years, media lawyers 
cultivated the idea that a majority of the Justices in Branzburg had 
actually endorsed a First Amendment privilege, and numerous courts 
embraced that idea. The theory arose from Justice Powell’s opinion in 
Branzburg, in which he seemed to share the dissenters’ view that the 
First Amendment requires some protection for journalists’ use of 
confidential sources.57 The argument was that the four dissenters plus 
Justice Powell should be treated as the majority in Branzburg.58 But as 
Judge Posner pointed out, this fiction could be sustained only by 
ignoring the fact that Justice Powell concurred fully in the majority 
opinion, not just in the judgment.59 Judge Posner not only refuted the 
theory, he scolded judges who accepted it.60 Posner’s criticisms left 
journalists without a convincing claim of Supreme Court support for 
their theory that the First Amendment protects their right to keep 
confidences.  
Another unraveling event was the subpoena controversy that arose 
over the outing of CIA agent Valerie Plame.61 After Plame’s husband 
published an op-ed article casting doubt on one of President George W. 
Bush’s justifications for the invasion of Iraq, someone leaked to several 
journalists Plame’s name and affiliation.62 A special prosecutor issued 
subpoenas to force the reporters to reveal who gave them the 
information.63 When the courts rejected the reporters’ claims of 
privilege, one of the journalists, Judith Miller of the N w York Times, 
went to jail for eighty-five days for refusing to disclose her source.64 
The other, Matt Cooper of Time, kept the confidence and was also held 
in contempt, but his employer capitulated and named the source.65 
Miller eventually won release by naming her source, explaining that the 
source had released her from her pledge of confidentiality.66 The 
                                                                                                                     
 56. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 57. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 727–30 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 58. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531–32. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 532. 
 61. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 62. Id. at 1143. 
 63. Id. at 1143–44. 
 64. David Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A1. 
 65. Bill Saporito, When to Give Up a Source, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 34, 34. 
 66. David Johnston, Rove Ordered to Talk Again in Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2005, at A1. 
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extensive publicity that accompanied the Plame controversy exposed a 
seamy web of relationships between Washington reporters and high-
level government sources, and made it clear that no noble purpose had 
been served by journalists’ reliance on confidential sources in that case. 
The episode was not likely to convince anyone that confidential sources 
play a critical role in democracy.67 
The Plame case did make clear, however, that there is an inescapable 
connection between leaks and government secrecy policies. The 
controversy arose during “a draconian clampdown on the free flow of 
government information to the public,”68 which greatly increased the 
press’ dependence on leaks for information about important public 
issues. The Bush Administration closed many channels of authorized 
disclosure.69 It reversed the policy of previous administrations that 
information should be presumed disclosable under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), replaced that policy with an instruction to 
agencies to carefully consider all possibly applicable exemptions before 
granting FOIA requests, and pledged to defend agency decisions to 
withhold information.70 The White House instructed agencies to 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Lost in the debris of the Plame affair was an important lesson. Had the district court 
accorded the journalists a privilege of even the weakest sort, a great deal of pain and expense 
could have been avoided. It eventually became clear that by the time the special prosecutor 
subpoenaed the journalists, he already knew that the initial source of the leak was Richard 
Armitage, a former deputy Secretary of State. S eDavid Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves 
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Armitage first told authorities he 
was the source of the leak two months before the prosecutor began his investigation). If the 
court had entertained the possibility that a qualified privilege applied, the prosecutor would have 
been required to show that the information sought from the reporters was not available from 
other sources—a showing he would have been unable to make. Further, if the reason Armitage 
was never charged was that no crime was committed, the subpoenas should have been quashed 
on the additional ground that there was no evidence that the journalists’ information was 
relevant to the investigation of a crime. As is true in many subpoena controversies, the case for 
compelling disclosure looked far stronger at the outset than it did once some rudimentary facts 
became known. But if there is no basis for a claim of privilege, there is no mechanism for 
eliciting those facts. 
 68. Clint Hendler, What We Didn’t Know Has Hurt Us, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REV., Jan.–
Feb. 2009, at 28, 28. 
 69. See Reeling from Hurricane “W”, THE NEWS MEDIA &  THE LAW, Fall 2008, at 4, 4. 
 70.  The Department of Justice, under John Ashcroft, instructed heads of federal 
departments and agencies that 
[a]ny discretionary decision by your agency to disclose information protected 
under the FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate consideration of 
the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be 
implicated by disclosure of the information. . . . When you carefully consider 
FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be 
assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they 
lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the 
ability of other agencies to protect other important records. 
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withhold “information that could be misused to harm the security of our 
nation or threaten public safety” even if the material was not within the 
national security exception to the FOIA and was not classified.71 At the 
behest of the Administration, Congress created a large new exemption to 
the FOIA, making it a crime for a federal employee to disclose 
information voluntarily supplied to a federal agency if the entity 
supplying it has designated it “critical infrastructure information,”72 and 
at least one federal employee was sentenced to prison for giving 
“sensitive but unclassified” information to a reporter.73 In addition, 
President Bush issued an executive order allowing the sitting president to 
prevent the release of papers of the previous presidents and giving all past 
presidents and vice presidents power to prevent release of their papers.74 
The number of documents classified annually increased greatly,75 and 
federal employees were forbidden to disclose even some non-classified 
documents.76 The Bush Administration warned officials that it would 
not tolerate unauthorized disclosures, and employees were asked to sign 
waivers of any confidentiality agreements they had made, or might 
make in the future, with reporters.77 By the time of the Plame 
                                                                                                                     
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft on The Freedom of Information Act to Heads 
of all Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 71. Memorandum from Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr. 
on Action to Safeguard Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other 
Sensitive Documents Related to Homeland Security to Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost 
10.htm (last visited June 29, 2009) (forwarding memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, 
Acting Director of Information Security Oversight Office, Richard L. Huff and Daniel J. 
Metcalfe, Co-Directors of Office of Information Privacy within the Department of Justice).  
 72. 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2006). Critics said this provision was used by agencies and businesses to 
conceal matters that had more to do with environmental and public safety issues than with 
terrorism risks. See Trudy Lieberman, Homeland Security: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: 
Imagining Evil, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 24, 29–30. 
 73. See Lori Robertson, In Control, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 26, 31. 
 74. See Hendler, supra note 68, at 29. This power was extended not only to past 
presidents and vice presidents during their lifetimes but also to their heirs. Id. 
 75. See Rebecca Carr, Open Government in America: Rise in Secrecy Guards No One, 
Critics Say, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Mar. 14, 2005, at A1. The increase was almost 78% from 
2001 to 2004. Id. 
 76. See John Files, Security Dept. Eases Its Nondisclosure Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 
2005, at A17 (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security was revising a six-month-old 
policy of requiring employees to sign pledges not to disclose “sensitive but unclassified” 
information, and replacing that policy with a program of training employees to avoid such 
disclosures). 
 77. See Douglas McCollam, Why the Plame Case Is So Scary: Attack at the Source, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 29, 32, 34 (reporting two instances in which 
hundreds of government employees were asked to sign such waivers); Adam Liptak, Reporters 
Face Scrutiny in C.I.A. Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A18 (reporting that Special 
Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald required White House officials to sign confidentiality waivers). 
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controversy, the Bush Administration’s control of information could not 
be ignored. 78 
Tighter information-control policies make unauthorized leaks more 
important to both the government and the press.79 From the government’s 
point of view, information-control policies will be ineffective if the 
government cannot control unauthorized disclosures. From the press 
point of view, when government shuts down authorized avenues of 
disclosure, leaks become the only source of information. From sources’ 
point of view, when the government increases the peril of leaking, 
confidentiality becomes even more important to the leakers. It is an 
escalation that has no natural end as long as the two sides adhere to 
conflicting views of their responsibilities. Leaks are not always inimical 
to government information control. The leak of Plame’s identity, for 
example, appeared to be an instrument of the government’s information 
policies; it was an instance of high-level officials clandestinely 
dispensing information that the government wanted known but was not 
willing to disclose openly. Many statements attributed to confidential 
sources fit that description; some journalists say that is the most common 
use of confidential sources in Washington.80 But leaks also come from 
whistleblowers, dissenters, and malcontents who are willing to tell what 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Some of the Bush secrecy policies have already been reversed. For example, one of 
President Barack Obama’s earliest acts was to reinstate the presumption in favor of disclosure in 
FOIA requests. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Freedom of Information Act to 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Freedom_of_Information_Act/ (last visited June 
29, 2009). But White House control over information has been tightening for at least a quarter 
century, and will no doubt continue. As Lori Robertson explains: 
An emphasis on tighter news management has been building as each successive 
administration learns from the previous one. A rigid approach to staying on 
message and a clampdown on access for reporters and the public have been 
increasingly used by the executive branch, a trend that began to take shape 
during the Reagan administration, if not earlier. The current Bush 
administration has shown that the method can be perfected, with little to no 
downside for the White House.  
Robertson, supra note 73, at 28.  
 79. One of the many ironies of the Miller and Cooper cases was that the subpoenas in these 
cases disserved the government’s interests in secrecy. Once the special prosecutor was appointed, 
the cases took on a life of their own, exposing secrets the White House could not have been happy 
to see exposed. Had President Bush known the leakers would turn out to be his own people, he no 
doubt would have preferred to handle the matter internally rather than through a highly publicized 
legal proceeding.  
 80. Cf. Lorne Manly, Big News Media Join in Push to Limit Use of Unidentified Sources, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at C1 (reporting that USA Today, The Washington Post, The Los 
Angeles Times, NBC News, and the New York Times were taking steps to curtail use of 
anonymous sources in response to criticism from the White House and others). 
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they know on condition of anonymity, and these are the principal 
resources available to the press and public in their perpetual struggle 
against government secrecy. This does not justify all journalistic uses of 
confidential sources, nor does it suggest that all should be legally 
protected, but it does indicate that some of them are important 
instruments in democratic accountability. 
In Branzburg, the Court doubted that requiring reporters to disclose 
their sources to grand juries would “undermine the freedom of the press 
to collect and disseminate news.”81 Since then, the Court in other 
contexts has developed more sensitivity to the realities under which the 
press receives information.82 The past decade has made it clearer than 
ever that freedom of the press requires some protection for confidential 
sources.83 If there is a case to be made to the contrary, it would be that 
the need for governmental secrecy is paramount. The ability to compel 
reporters to identify leakers is a crucial enforcement device to a 
government that believes secrecy is necessary or at least desirable. If 
other liberties must be compromised in the interest of combating terror, 
perhaps we must also be prepared to forego freedom of the press insofar 
as that includes the ability to rely on confidential sources. But the 
argument that full freedom of the press is a luxury we can no longer 
afford is a very different argument from the claim that compelling 
disclosure of sources does not seriously threaten freedom of the press.84 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972). 
 82. For example, the Court has held that the press cannot be punished for, or even made to 
pay for, injuries resulting from its disclosure of information furnished to it illegally. See Fla. 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527–29, 541 (1989) (holding that state may not award damages to 
rape victim named as a result of sheriff’s unlawful disclosure of victim’s name). Wiretap 
statutes making it a crime to disclose information that the defendant knows was obtained 
through an illegal interception cannot be enforced against parties not involved in the actual 
interception, at least when the information is about matters of public concern. See Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18, 535 (2001). Because this principle speaks only to publication, 
not the withholding of information, it is not directly applicable to disclosure of confidential 
sources. But the privacy case described above protects the press’ right to use information 
illegally furnished to it, and the wiretap case protects its use of information illegally obtained by 
its source. The Court’s decision in both cases to treat illegally obtained information as being 
“lawfully acquired” by the press is at least tacit recognition that acquisition of information 
cannot be lightly excluded from constitutional protection. 
 83. A survey of news organizations counted 823 subpoenas directed at news organizations 
in 2001. See Samantha Fredrickson, A Reporter’s Privilege in Tatters, THE NEWS MEDIA &  THE 
LAW, Fall 2008, at 15, 17. A similar survey counted 3,062 in 2006. Id.  
 84. In Branzburg, the Court characterized the reporters’ proposal generically as a “First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege,” and did not identify the Press Clause specifically as the basis of 
the claim. 408 U.S. at 698–700. It is difficult to argue with a straight face, however, that the claim 
does not rest squarely on the Press Clause. If it rested on the Speech Clause, all speakers—which is 
to say everyone—presumably could claim a right to refuse to disclose confidential sources. That 
would decimate the fact-finding process, so that a privilege based on the Speech Clause would 
have to be limited to a subset of speakers. The subset was identified by the claimants in Branzburg 
(and is identified in the many lower court cases recognizing a privilege) as “reporters.” Id. at 695, 
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Recognition that it does threaten freedom of the press is widespread 
today.85 At the same time, events of the past decade have diminished the 
likelihood that journalists will be allowed to maintain confidences. 
Although shield statutes are still in place, the tenuous but widespread 
consensus that reporters have a constitutional right to protect their 
sources has all but vanished. 
III.   OBJECTIONS TO A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE 
The constitutional response advocated by the press is recognition of 
a journalists’ privilege under the First Amendment, one of the sort 
rejected by the Court in Branzburg but subsequently adopted by many 
lower courts. This privilege would take the form of a constitutional rule, 
usually articulated along the following lines: “disclosure may be 
ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: 
highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of 
the claim, and not obtainable from other available sources.”86 
Such a rule does not begin to answer the many questions it raises: 
Who qualifies as a journalist for purposes of the privilege? Does it 
apply only to the identity of confidential sources, or also to information 
given in confidence by sources whose identity is known? Does it apply 
to non-confidential information? Can the privilege be waived by the 
source? Does it permit a judge to order a journalist to disclose to the 
judge in-camera so the judge can determine whether the information is 
critical to the claim? Who has the burden of showing that the 
information is or is not available from other sources? Such questions 
can be answered on a case-by-case basis, but the resulting elaboration of 
the privilege makes it look less like a constitutional rule than a statute—
which suggests that perhaps the matter is better suited for statutory 
resolution in the first place. 
                                                                                                                     
703–05. There have been a few cases extending the privilege to scholars and other non-
journalists, but it is identified almost universally as a “reporter’s privilege” and a number of 
courts have refused to extend it to claimants not employed by news organizations. See, e g., In 
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 29 Med. L. Rptr. 2301, 2304 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1011 (2002). Identifying it as a “reporter’s 
privilege” rather than a “press privilege” may be a tactically useful way of pretending that the 
beneficiaries are individuals rather than powerful organizations, but it is not an honest way of 
avoiding reliance on the Press Clause. Under any name, a constitutional rule protecting 
journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential sources reflects a belief that journalists 
play a role in the system of freedom of expression that is distinguishable from the roles of other 
speakers. Ignoring the clause that the Constitution itself uses to identify the subset of speakers to 
which journalists belong would be perverse. 
 85. The attorneys general of thirty-four states joined an amicus curiae brief urging the 
Supreme Court to reconsider Branzburg. See Brief for States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-
1508).  
 86. McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982). 
17
Anderson: Confidential Sources Reconsidered
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
900 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
Another objection to a constitutional reporter’s privilege is that it is 
a one-size-fits-all solution to an issue that has many dimensions. 
Sometimes confidential sources shed light on important matters of 
public policy, political or business misfeasance, or dangers to public 
safety. But they also can be used to circulate trivial gossip, baseless 
rumors, or malicious assaults.87 A subpoena sought by a libel plaintiff 
seeking to show that the defendant in fact had no source for its 
defamatory allegation, or one sought by a criminal defendant seeking to 
show that a reporter has information that could exonerate the defendant, 
is very different from a subpoena issued by a congressional committee 
angered by a network’s criticism of the Pentagon.88 Of course, the 
process of deciding whether the information sought is sufficiently 
material and necessary to override the privilege will take into account 
some of those differences, but not all. In the libel context, a public-
figure plaintiff may have a strong and legitimate argument for the 
materiality and necessity of information that might show actual malice. 
However, a libel suit can also be a tactical maneuver, the objective of 
which is merely to discover a source. The proposed constitutional rule 
provides no means of sorting out such cases. Some courts have adopted 
rules aimed at prescreening the libel suit to require disclosure only 
when the claim appears to have some merit.89 But trying to incorporate 
such procedures in a constitutional rule is an unsatisfactory enterprise. 
A very different set of problems arises when a criminal defendant seeks 
to compel disclosure. In that setting, the standard criteria for defeating 
the privilege are themselves inadequate. Whether the information is 
critical to the maintenance of the claim is the wrong inquiry; anything 
that might plant reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind can be decisive, 
regardless of its materiality by civil litigation standards. Again, courts 
could develop a specific constitutional rule for information sought by 
criminal defendants, but that too makes the matter look less like one 
appropriate for constitutional resolution. 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See Daniel Okrent, The Public Editor: Briefers and Leakers and the Newspapers Who 
Enable Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at D12 (asserting that “many who cover those twin 
cesspools of duplicity, self-regard, and back-stabbing—Hollywood and politics—are addicted to 
the practice” of relying on confidential sources). 
 88. See Corydon B. Dunham, FIGHTING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT: STANTON OF CBS VS. 
CONGRESS AND THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 1–6 (1997) (describing the ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt by a congressional committee to hold CBS president Frank Stanton in contempt of 
Congress for refusing to provide outtakes of a CBS documentary, The Selling of the Pentagon). 
 89. See, e.g., Downing v. Monitor Publ’g Co., 415 A.2d 683, 686 (N.H. 1980) (holding 
that a libel plaintiff must “satisfy the trial court that he has evidence to establish that there is a 
genuine issue of fact regarding the falsity of the publication” before disclosure can be 
compelled); Atlanta Journal Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that libel plaintiff must show viability of claim before disclosure can be compelled). 
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A.  Leak Cases Pose Special Problems 
In my view, cases in which the reporter’s testimony is sought in an 
attempt to find the source of a government leak also require a 
particularized response. The main reason is that they pose a special risk 
of official oppression.90 The party trying to find the source of the leak is 
often an official whose hackles are up because of the fact of the leak, or 
the content of the information leaked, or both. The official is usually a 
judge trying to find out who defied the judge’s gag order, a prosecutor 
embarrassed that the press has learned something that official 
investigators failed to uncover, or an executive official who is put under 
pressure or subjected to criticism because of the disclosure. In 
Branzburg, both Justice White’s opinion for the Court and Justice 
Powell’s concurrence acknowledged this possibility, but the response of 
both was only that reporters should not be required to testify in 
investigations being conducted in bad faith.91 That is an inadequate 
response, because of the well-known reluctance of judges to find that 
other public officials are acting in bad faith.92  
In other First Amendment contexts, the Court is far more sensitive to 
the risk that political pique or retaliation for unfavorable coverage may 
be at work, even if it cannot be proved. For example, a tax that treats 
some newspapers differently from others is presumptively 
unconstitutional because it could potentially be used for censorial 
purposes, even when no such purpose is even alleged and the evidence 
indicates that the legislature intended no censorship.93 An ordinance that 
gives a city official broad discretion to regulate placement of news 
                                                                                                                     
 90. For a persuasive documentation of the risk—and reality—of arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or punitive use of the subpoena power to pursue leakers, see William E. Lee, Deep Background: 
Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (2008). 
 91. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693–95, 707–08 (1972); id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 92. For example, a freelance author writing a book about a criminal defendant was asked 
by the government to become an informant for the FBI. See Guillermo X. Garcia, The Vanessa 
Leggett Saga, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 2002, at 20, 24. She declined, and the United States 
Attorney then subpoenaed the author’s notes of interviews she had with the defendant. See id. 
The prosecutor did not follow Justice Department guidelines for subpoenas to journalists on the 
ground that the author was not a journalist, and refused to negotiate limits on the material 
sought or the uses to which it might be put. Seeid. at 25. The interviewee had been in police 
custody, so there was no apparent reason why the police or the prosecutor’s agents could not 
have asked him the same questions the writer asked. Id. A grand jury was able to bring 
indictments without benefit of the writer’s testimony. See id. at 21. Nonetheless, a district judge 
held the writer in contempt and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the allegation of bad faith 
on the ground that the writer had failed to establish that the grand jury bore her malice and 
ignoring the circumstances mentioned above. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 Med. L. Rptr. 
2301 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion). The writer served 168 days in jail. See Garcia, 
supra, at 21.  
 93. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
585–86, 588 (1983). 
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racks on public sidewalks is unconstitutional because it creates a risk of 
“undetectable censorship.”94 There are similar risks of un-provable 
official oppression when government is allowed to compel reporters to 
disclose the sources of leaks. 
Another constitutional analogy also seems applicable to cases in 
which the government seeks to compel disclosure to police leaks by its 
own agents. When a government official improperly makes privacy-
invading information about a citizen available to the press, the Court 
has held that the press cannot be held liable for disclosing the 
information.95 This is true even though the agent’s disclosure to the 
press was in violation of a statute.96 “Where . . . the government has 
failed to police itself in disseminating information, it is clear . . . that the 
imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication 
can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding 
anonymity.”97 Of course, the issue there is whether the press can be 
punished for publishing the information furnished to it by the 
government agent, not whether it can be punished for refusing to 
identify the agent. But if the government’s responsibility to control its 
own agents trumps the citizen’s right to redress for injuries suffered 
when it fails to do so, the same reasoning casts doubt on the 
government’s right to enlist the help of the press in discovering 
leakers.98 
In these other areas, the Court demonstrates the sensitivity to risks of 
unprovable censorship and insists the government control its own 
agents instead of shifting that burden to third parties. Those principles 
seem to suggest that compelling disclosure to ferret out government 
sources who leak to the press ought to be viewed with more skepticism 
than subpoenas in other contexts. Perhaps compulsory disclosure for 
this purpose ought to be prohibited altogether; maybe courts could 
devise ways of identifying cases in which the inference of oppressive 
motive is strong enough to preclude enforcement. My purpose here is 
not to propose specific solutions for the various types of subpoena 
controversies, but to show that they are too diverse to admit any single, 
simple, constitutional solution. 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762, 772 (1988). 
 95. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
 96. In Florida Star, a sheriff’s office made a rape victim’s name available to the press 
despite a statute that made it a crime to cause or allow such information to be published. Id. at 
526–28. The sheriff’s department settled the victim’s civil suit against it for violating the statute. 
Id. at 528. 
 97. Id. at 538. 
 98. It could be argued that this might leave the government with no effective means of 
preventing unauthorized disclosures by its agents, but in the privacy context, the Court was 
untroubled by the fact that the government had tried, and failed, to prevent the agent’s 
disclosure by criminalizing it. See id. at 540.  
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B.  Identifying “Reporters” 
The most compelling objection to a comprehensive constitutional 
solution is the futility of trying to decide as a matter of constitutional 
law who should have the right to protect confidential sources. The 
majority in Branzburg was concerned that the claims made on behalf of 
“reporters” could also be made by “lecturers, political pollsters, 
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists,”99 or anyone else who 
contributes to the flow of information to the public. “Sooner or later, it 
would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who 
qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the 
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely 
pamphleteer . . . just as much as of the large metropolitan 
publisher . . . .”100 Justice Stewart’s dissent did not address this point; he 
said variously that the right would belong to reporters or newsmen.101 A 
few years later, Justice Stewart indicated that he viewed the press, for 
purposes of the Press Clause, as “the daily newspapers and other 
established news media.”102 Presumably, Justice Stewart believed the 
reporter’s privilege required by the Press Clause would belong to those 
who were employed by such news organizations. Most shield statutes 
adopt similar definitions of the beneficiaries of the privilege.103 
Today, such a definition is woefully inadequate. Established news 
media are disappearing or morphing into forms indistinguishable from 
new media that are anything but established. Affording the right to 
protect sources only to journalists who work for daily newspapers or 
other established news media would deny it to many important news 
sources. The broadest suggestions propose to give the privilege to 
anyone engaged in gathering or processing information for any public 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 702–05 (1972). 
100. Id. at 704. 
101. See generally id. at 728–30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (focusing on confidential 
relationship between reporter and informant when gathering news).  
102. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 631 (1975). 
103. See, e.g., CAL. EVID . CODE § 1070(a) (2009) (defining “newsman” as a “publisher, 
editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or 
other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has 
been so connected or employed” or “a radio or television news reporter or other person 
connected with or employed by a radio or television station. . . .”); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-h(b) (2009) (“[P]rofessional journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been 
employed or otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press 
association, wire service, radio or television transmission station or network or other 
professional medium of communicating news or information to the public. . . .”); FLA. STAT. 
§ 90.5015(a) (2009) (“‘Professional journalist’ means a person regularly engaged in collecting, 
photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing news, for gain or livelihood, 
who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried employee of, or independent 
contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or 
television station, network, or news magazine. . . .”). 
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medium of communications,104 but today that could include anyone 
with access to a computer or a handheld wireless internet device. The 
reality is that distinctions between reporters and the rest of us are 
disappearing, but no court will be eager to give most everyone a right to 
refuse to testify on the ground of confidentiality. 
That does not mean that no one can be given a reporter’s privilege. 
Freedom of the press can be served without according the same rights to 
everyone who might be considered press. Just as freedom of the press is 
served by giving a subset of the press access to the White House, so can 
it be served by giving the right to protect confidential sources to a 
subset of the press. But attempting to define that subset as a matter of 
constitutional law would be foolish. The realities as to who serves the 
press function in our society are changing rapidly and dramatically. A 
constitutional answer to that question would almost certainly be 
obsolete in a few years. 
IV.   A BETTER ALTERNATIVE 
If adoption of a constitutional reporter’s privilege is not the right 
solution, neither is it right to deny that compelled disclosure of sources 
raises any constitutional issue. However tenable that view may have 
been in 1972, much has changed since then. As evidence that requiring 
journalists to disclose their sources was widely believed to be consistent 
with freedom of the press, Justice White noted that the majority of 
states did not have shield statutes;105 today, almost three-fourths do. 
Branzburg was a product of pre-Watergate faith in government (the
decision was announced twelve days before the burglary of the 
Watergate Hotel). Today, much of Justice White’s opinion for the Court 
seems naïve or cavalier. He asserted that compelled disclosure of 
sources imposed no restraint  
on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to 
acquire. . . . [W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that 
the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to 
conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence 
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime 
than to do something about it.106  
                                                                                                                     
104. See, e.g., Dan Paul, Why a Shield Law?, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 459, 461 (1975). 
105. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689–90 (majority opinion). 
106. Id. at 691–92. In a similar vein, Justice White argued,  
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news 
about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over 
the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/9
2009] CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES RECONSIDERED 905 
 
Since then we have seen many instances in which important 
information became public only because sources trusted journalists to 
keep confidences—from the Watergate scandal107 to the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib,108 the existence of secret CIA prisons in Eastern Europe,109 and 
the warrantless surveillance of telephone and email communications 
between U.S. citizens and persons abroad.110 But it has also become 
clear that not all disclosures by confidential sources are of equal 
importance. 
The best solution to the confidential source problem would be one 
that recognizes that compelled disclosure of journalists’ sources can 
threaten freedom of the press seriously enough to be unconstitutional, 
but leaves the remedy largely to the legislatures or the common law.111  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the 
future. 
Id. at 695. 
107. The role of the Nixon administration in the burglary was disclosed to the Washington 
Post by W. Mark Felt, who for thirty years was identified only as Deep Throat. See Todd S. 
Purdum, ‘Deep Throat’ Unmasks Himself: Ex-No.2 at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1. 
Mr. Felt, who was the number two official at the FBI at the time of the scandal, identified 
himself as the Washington Post’s source in 2005. Id. 
108. The abuse of prisoners by guards at this prison in Iraq was exposed when CBS’ 60 
Minutes II broadcasted photos taken by the guards themselves and given to CBS by confidential 
sources. See Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense 
Mishandled the Disaster at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38, 39–40.  
109. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons-Debate Is Growing 
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01 (quoting unnamed senior intelligence officials). 
110. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (quoting unnamed sources to reveal the existence of a 
National Security Agency program to wiretap conversations between United States citizens and 
persons overseas). One of the newspaper’s sources was eventually revealed to be Thomas M. 
Tamm, a Justice Department official who discovered the program and believed it to be illegal. 
See Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle; Thomas M. Tamm Was Entrusted with 
some of the Government’s Most Important Secrets. He Had a Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Security Clearance, a Level Above Top Secret. Government Agents had probed 
Tamm’s Background, his Friends and Associates, and Determined him Trustworthy, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 2008, at 40. 
111. Larry Sager pointed out long ago that there is nothing unusual about constitutional 
norms that are not judicially enforceable. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–20 (1978) 
(discussing application of thesis to identifying such norms in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence). What I suggest here is slightly different: the norm would be judicially 
enforced—by refusing to enforce subpoenas that threaten freedom of the press—but the courts 
would not prescribe a constitutional remedy.  
23
Anderson: Confidential Sources Reconsidered
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
906 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
A.  Enforcing the Norm Through Legislation 
If there is no shield statute, or the statute does not preclude 
enforcement of the subpoena, courts should not attempt to fill the gap 
by crafting a constitutional reporters’ privilege. The only essential 
constitutional question is whether compelling the testimony in the 
particular case would abridge freedom of the press. In theory, courts are 
not constitutionally required to say anything more than that. In practice, 
they give reasons; reasons enable people—in this case, sources and 
reporters—to make educated guesses as to how future cases will be 
decided. It does not follow, however, that the reasons must themselves 
be treated as constitutional rules. The better solution is to identify the 
sources of the constitutional problem and let the legislature attempt to 
cure it. If the decision is that enforcing the subpoena would violate the 
First Amendment for the reason that compulsory disclosure would 
never be constitutionally permissible on facts like those at bar, that 
reason, of course, is a constitutional rule. If the court believes ordering 
disclosure on facts like those at bar could not threaten freedom of the 
press, there is no constitutional issue. In cases between those extremes, 
the question would be whether the subpoena threatens press freedom 
seriously enough to violate the First Amendment. In answering that 
question, the court should consider not only the merits of the case at 
hand, but also what mechanisms the state provides for protecting press 
freedom. Compelling disclosure after the need for the information has 
been weighed against the risk to press freedom, in accordance with a 
shield statute or a common law privilege, is less likely to threaten 
freedom of the press than compelling disclosure when the law has 
provided no (or only an inadequate) mechanism to evaluate the need for 
the information and the dangers of exposing the source. If the court 
believes enforcement of the subpoena in question would be 
unconstitutional, it should simply quash the subpoena. That tells the 
legislature that similar subpoenas will not be enforceable at least until 
the legislature provides a better mechanism for deciding which 
subpoenas are enforceable, but does not create a constitutional rule that 
forecloses the legislature’s options in deciding how to address the 
problem. 
B.  Enforcing the Norm Through Common Law  
In the federal courts and some states, judges have the additional 
option of developing a common law response.112 They could craft a 
                                                                                                                     
112. Federal courts have undoubted authority to develop common law evidentiary 
privileges. See, e.g., Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d. Cir. 1972). In some states, 
courts are denied such authority except through the formal rule-making process for rules of 
evidence. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID . 501 (2009). Even in such states, however, courts sometimes 
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comprehensive common law privilege intended to cover all press 
subpoena controversies, or they could proceed in the more usual 
common law fashion—developing the response incrementally, deciding 
in each case only as many details of the privilege as are necessary to 
decide the case at hand. As to whether they should try to create in 
advance a full-blown common law privilege that will resolve all future 
cases, there are considerations pressing in both directions. On one hand, 
that is a bad idea for the same reason that a First Amendment privilege 
is inadvisable: there are too many disparate kinds of subpoena 
controversies to admit a single solution. On the other hand, the 
unpredictability of incremental common law development may seem to 
counsel against that approach. If the objective is to give sources some 
assurance that they can talk to journalists in confidence without fear that 
the reporter will be forced to violate the confidence, any uncertainty as 
to how much protection the law will provide undermines that objective.  
That concern, however, appears to be less convincing in practice 
than in theory. Even the most elaborate of the existing reporter’s 
privileges—whether First Amendment, statutory, or common law—
contain so many variables that it is rarely possible to have complete 
assurance that the confidence cannot be breached. At the time the 
source is deciding whether to talk, it is impossible to know the 
circumstances in which disclosure may be demanded. Where a 
reporter’s privilege exists, it seems to work not so much by providing 
firm assurance that the law will not permit the particular confidence to 
be breached, but by leading sources to believe that reporters will refuse 
to disclose and that anyone seeking to force them to disclose will at 
least face some legal impediments. Even if the courts reject the 
incremental approach in favor of a comprehensive common law 
privilege, that response is still preferable to a constitutional privilege 
because it can be more easily modified when that seems desirable. 
Because it is only common law, it can be modified by the legislature, 
and courts need not accord it the same presumption of immutability that 
they would extend to a constitutional rule.  
C.  Honoring Branzburg 
Treating compulsory disclosure of reporters’ confidential sources as 
a potential constitutional problem but not imposing a constitutionally 
prescribed solution leaves states with a wide range of options. States 
can simply abandon the effort to enforce subpoenas of the sort that have 
been held unconstitutional, the legislature can address the matter by 
                                                                                                                     
create new common law privileges. See, e.g., Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 340–41 (Tex. 
1987) (recognizing common law privilege, not recognized by rules of evidence, for ongoing law 
enforcement investigations). 
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statute, or the courts can address it as a matter of common law. This 
approach seems consistent with Branzburg.113 The Branzburg Court did 
not deny that compelling disclosure could violate the First Amendment; 
the majority opinion acknowledged that “news gathering is not without 
its First Amendment protections . . . . We do not expect that courts will 
forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First 
Amendment as well as the Fifth.”114 Justice Powell added, “In short, the 
courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where 
legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.”115 The 
majority also acknowledged the suitability of more flexible 
nonconstitutional responses.116 What the Justices were loathe to do was 
create the First Amendment privilege proposed by the reporters in that 
case. They were concerned about the details of such a privilege: to 
whom it would apply, the circumstances in which it could be defeated, 
the burdens that would fall on judges in administering the privilege.117 
These concerns convinced the Court that “[t]he administration of a 
constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and 
conceptual difficulties of a high order.”118 
If the parties in Branzburg had embraced the approach advocated 
here, they would not have urged the Court to adopt a constitutional rule 
applicable to all reporters seeking to protect confidential sources. 
Instead, they would have argued that the subpoenas in question could 
not be enforced because compelling the three reporters to reveal their 
sources when the government had in place no mechanism for resolving 
conflicts between press freedom and evidentiary needs,119 would violate 
                                                                                                                     
113. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–91 (1972). 
114. Id. at 707–08. 
115. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
116. The majority explained: 
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory 
newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and 
rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned 
and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time 
may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First 
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and 
problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and 
press in their own areas. 
Id. at 706 (majority opinion). 
117. Id. at 704. 
118. Id. at 703–04. 
119. Under this approach, the Court might well have reached different decisions in the 
three cases before it. Two of the reporters had been subpoenaed by federal grand juries, and 
federal law gave those reporters no recourse. Id. at 675, 677. The third, Paul Branzburg, was 
subpoenaed by a state grand jury in Kentucky, which had a shield statute. Id. at 668. The 
Kentucky courts held the statute inapplicable on the ground that Branzburg was an eyewitness 
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the Press Clause. It is entirely possible, of course, that the Court would 
have rejected that proposition too, but the majority seemed open to that 
sort of incremental, case-by-case approach.120 
The Branzburg opinions have perplexed two generations of lawyers, 
judges, scholars, and journalists. The skepticism expressed in some 
parts of the majority opinion as to whether press subpoenas impose any 
serious burden on press freedom leads some to believe the Court saw no 
constitutional problem. But that reading is hard to square with other 
aspects of the opinion. Every Justice accepted the idea that freedom of 
the press requires some protection for newsgathering, and that 
compelling reporters to reveal confidences will deter some sources from 
furnishing information.121 The majority stated enigmatically that “grand 
juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment,”122 and 
Justice Powell asserted that “courts will be available to newsmen under 
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require 
protection.”123 These statements are not consistent with the claim that 
compelled disclosure of reporters’ confidences raises no constitutional 
issue. At the same time, the majority—which included Powell—rejected 
the argument that “refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter’s 
                                                                                                                     
to crimes, not merely a recipient of information from a confidential source. Id. at 669. It might 
be hard to persuade a court that such a limited exception to an otherwise protective shield statute 
posed so substantial a threat to press freedom as to violate the Press Clause. 
120. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (“At the federal level, Congress has freedom to 
determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion 
standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, 
equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is 
also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own 
standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law 
enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are 
powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own 
constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.”); see also 
id. at 709 (“Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. We 
do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First 
Amendment as well as the Fifth.”). In another passage, however, the majority suggested that a 
case-by-case approach would not meet the reporters’ claimed need to be able to give assurances 
of confidentiality. See id. at 702 n.39. 
121. The majority said, “We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or 
assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for 
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the 
press could be eviscerated.” Id. at 681. The majority also accepted that some sources will 
“refuse to talk to newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official investigation.” 
Id. at 695. The dissenters thought it obvious that “when neither the reporter nor his source can 
rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of the grand jury’s subpoena power, 
valuable information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be 
impoverished.” Id. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 708 (majority opinion). 
123. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and 
disseminate news.”124 If we understand the majority as being 
sympathetic with the end but leery of the means, these positions are 
reconcilable. After surveying the numerous details that would have to 
be resolved in administering the constitutional privilege sought by the 
reporters, the majority said, “We are unwilling to embark the judiciary 
on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination.”125 The 
solution proposed here spares the courts that difficulty. It accounts for 
the views of all the members of the Branzburg majority. Most 
importantly, it recognizes that confidential source problems may have 
constitutional dimensions, but it avoids constitutionalizing the entire 
subject. 
                                                                                                                     
124. Id. at 698–99 (majority opinion). 
125. Id. at 703. 
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